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RESOLVING THE DISSONANT CONSTITUTIONAL CHORDS
INHERENT IN THE FEDERAL ANTI-BOOTLEGGING STATUTE
IN UNITED STATES v. MOGHADAM
The layman's constitutional view is that what he likes is
constitutional and that which he doesn't like is
unconstitutional.1
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of affordable, publicly available music record-
ing technology, the number of "bootlegged" recordings on the mar-
ket has grown. 2 A bootleg recording generally contains live concert
performances never intended for commercial release.3 Differences
exist between bootleg, pirate and counterfeit recordings. 4 A coun-
1. Hugo L. Black, Justice Black, 85 Tomorrow, Has No Plans to Leave Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1971, at 38.
2. See Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA Releases Year-End Piracy
Statistics, at http://www.riaa.com/PR_- Story.cfm?id=279 (last visited Oct. 7, 2000).
For example, by mid-1998, no bootleg CD-Recordables ("CD-R") discs were seized.
See Recording Industry Association of America, R!AA Releases 1999 Mid-Year Anti-
Piracy Statistics, at http://www.riaa.com/Protect-Campaign-6.cfm (last visited Oct.
7, 2000). By mid-1999, 10,485 bootleg CD-Rs were seized. See id. "The number of
counterfeit, pirate and bootleg CD-Rs seized in 1999 grew by more than 800% over
[ 1998] figures." See Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA Releases Year-
End Piracy Statistics, at http://www.riaa.com/PR-Story.cfm?id=279 (last visited Oct.
7, 2000). A CD-R is a disc that can be written with audio or data information only
once. See ALAN FREEMAN, THE COMPUTER GLOssARY 55 (8th ed. 1998). Machines
that can copy official audio compact discs onto blank CD-Rs are generally inexpen-
sive. See Recording Industry Association of America, CD-R Piracy, at http://
www.riaa.com/Protect-CDR.cfm (last visited Oct. 7, 2000).
3. See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 209-10 n.2 (1985) (defining
"bootleg" as "contain[ing] an unauthorized copy of a commercially unreleased
performance" from sources including "concert performances, motion picture
soundtracks, or television appearances"); Susan M. Deas, Jazzing Up the Copyright
Act? Resolving the Uncertainties of the United States Anti-Bootlegging Law, 20 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 567, 573 (1998) (noting that all it takes to make bootlegs "is
attending a live performance, surreptitiously recording it, reproducing the master
tape, then marketing the copies"); Todd D. Patterson, Comment, The Uruguay
Ro.nd's Anti-Rontlep Ping Provision: A Victory for Musical Artists and Record Companies,
15 Wis. IrNr'L L.J. 371, 373 (1997) (stating, "[a] bootleg tape, record, or compact
disc (CD) generally contains live music by a performer or performers that has
neither been nor ever was intended to be commercially produced and made availa-
ble to the public.") (footnote omitted).
4. See David Schwartz, Note, Strange Fixation: Bootleg Sound Recordings Enjoy the
Benefits ofImproving Technology, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 611, 622 (1995) (discussing con-
fusion between different types of music piracy); cf Jerry D. Brown, United States
Copyright Law After GATT: Why A New Chapter Eleven Means Bankruptcy for Bootleggers,
16 Loy. L.A. ENr. L.J. 1, 4 (1995) (categorizing bootlegging as three classes of
(327)
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terfeit recording is an unauthorized copy of a legitimate album.5
With counterfeit recordings, artists and record companies do not
collect royalties that would otherwise be included in the price of a
legitimate copy.6 Pirated recordings, however, generally compile
songs from various albums, usually by the same artist.7 Similar to
counterfeit recordings, record companies and artists do not receive
royalties from these unauthorized compilations.8 Bootlegs, unlike
music piracy: counterfeiting, pirating and classic bootlegging). Brown categorizes
the unauthorized recording of a live performance as classic bootlegging. See id.
Courts and legal commentators use the phrase "bootlegging" interchangeably. See
Carte P. Goodwin, Comment, Live in Concert . . .and Beyond: A New Standard of
Contributory Copyright Infringement, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 345, 345 n.4 (1999).
5. See Patterson, supra note 3, at 378 (defining "counterfeit" recording);
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 620 (differentiating between different types of record
piracy). Generally, counterfeit recordings are sold for less than the retail price.
See Goodwin, supra note 4, at 345 (stating counterfeit recordings are priced sub-
stantially lower than retail prices).
6. See Goodwin, supra note 4, at 346 (commenting that over $300 million in
revenue is lost each year from bootleg phonorecords in United States) (citing
Grayzone, Inc., The Federal Anti-Piracy and Bootleg FAQ, at http://
www.grayzone.com/faqindex.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2000)); Patterson, supra note
3, at 374 (noting artist could feel bootlegged performance represented sub-par
execution of songs and that music companies lose potential profits with bootlegs);
cf. Greg Kot, Bootleg Bounty Illicit Industry Delights Fans, But Not Record Industry, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 28, 1995, § 5, at 1 (quoting music journalist Clinton Heylin comment-
ing that "[o]n an artistic level, never trust the artist, trust the tale" and noting that
most fans agree that bootleg version of famous song is "better" than official ver-
sion). Additionally, record companies wish to limit their artists' output such that
each release is surrounded by "big-budget promotion campaigns." See id.
In the United States, a combined $400 million in revenue is lost annually from
counterfeit sound recordings and live performance bootlegs. See Patterson, supra
note 3, at 413; see also Brown, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that in 1993, global music
industry lost $2 billion to bootlegging). It is unclear if the Brown figure refers to
sales lost strictly from bootlegging or music piracy in general. See also Brown, supra
note 4, at 14 (stating that China has $347 million revenue from bootleg sales);
Goodwin, supra note 4, at 362-64 (noting bootleg recordings exports from Luxem-
bourg cost global music industry almost $500 million in 1996; Italian and German
exports in 1996 cost industry $51 million and $31 million, respectively); Patterson,
supra note 3, at 399 (noting German bootleg market worth in 1991 as $85.7 million
annually and Italian bootleg market worth in 1994 as close to $150 million annu-
ally). Generally, it costs five dollars to manufacture and package a bootleg, which
is then sold for ten dollars to an intermediary and sold by a retailer, usually a small
independent store, for double to triple that amount. See Kot, supra note 6, at 1.
7. See Dowling, 473 U.S. at 210 n.2 (distinguishing "bootleg" from "pirated"
record, noting that "[a pirated record is] an unauthorized copy of a performance
already commercially released."); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 621 (defining pirates
as those who release unauthorized compilations of previously released songs, usu-
ally by same artist); cf Brown, supra note 4, at 4 (describing piracy as unauthorized
duplication or sale of unreleased copyrighted works).
8. See Patterson, supra note 3, at 379 (noting that pirates pay neither royalties
nor musicians, so compilations sell for less than retail price); Schwartz, supra note
4, at 621 (commenting that pirate compilations are cheaper than official releases).
Even bands that allow taping of their concerts unkindly view bootleggers. See Kot,
supra note 6, at 1 ("We're sick of bootlegs. Some people think that's a contradic-
[Vol. 7: p. 327
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counterfeit or pirated recordings, are studio or live performances
not intended for public release. 9 Similarly, music companies and
artists do not receive royalties from bootlegs. 10
This Note examines United States v. Moghadam," which held
that the United States Constitution's Commerce Clause provided
sufficient constitutional authority to uphold the federal anti-boot-
legging statute.1 2 The court's holding raised the issue of whether a
statute, essentially a copyright law, may derive authority from a
source other than the Copyright Clause.13 Section II examines the
facts behind Moghadam's prosecution.1 4 Second, in Section III,
the Note explores the procedural and judicial history behind the
federal anti-bootlegging statute's enactment. 15 Third, in Sections
V and V, this Note examines the court's analysis in upholding the
anti-bootlegging statute under the Commerce Clause. 16 Finally,
tion because we allow people to tape our concerts, but the tapers for the most part
are totally ethical because they trade the tapes [and] they don't sell them for a
profit.") (quoting Grateful Dead spokesman Dennis McNally).
9. See Dowling, 473 U.S. at 209 n.2 (defining "bootlegging" as making of "un-
authorized cop [ies] of a commercially unreleased performance."); United States v.
Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1271 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999) (using Dowling bootleg defi-
nition throughout analysis); Deas, supra note 3, at 573 (defining bootleg as "re-
cording[s] of a live performance made without the consent of the performer");
Brown, supra note 4, at 4 (defining "[b]ootlegging in the classic sense as the unau-
thorized copy of a live performance of a copyrighted work"); Goodwin, supra note
4, at 345 (noting bootlegs are created by unauthorized recordings at live concerts,
live radio or live television broadcasts); Patterson, supra note 3, at 374-76 (noting
that bootlegged recordings contain live musical performances never intended for
commercial or public release); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 613 (categorizing "boot-
leg" as "tape, record, or compact disc (CD) [that] contains music or dialogue by a
performer or performers that has never been commercially available").
10. See Patterson, supa note 3, at 374 (noting that "performer [generally] ...
never receives any proceeds or royalties from the sale of [ ] bootlegged music and
live concerts."). But see Schwartz, supa note 4, at 614 (commenting that
"[w] hether the bootlegger deprives artists of profits by releasing material that the
artist has no intention of releasing anyway is debatable . . ").
11. 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), reh'g and reh'gen banc denied, 193 F.3d 525
(11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 120 S. Ct. 1529 (2000).
12. See id. at 1282 (holding that Commerce Clause provided sufficient consti-
tutional su-ort for anti-bootloin- tqtlitel Fnr fnrther discussion of the
.. . .. .
00l 
. . . . . . .
.o --- o .. .. . _ . . ..
Moghadam court's conclusion that the Commerce Clause supported the federal
anti-bootlegging statute, see infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
13. For an examination of the Moghadam holding, see infra notes 152-72 and
accompanying text.
14. For further discussion of the case facts, see infra notes 18-21 and accompa-
nying text.
15. For an exploration of the procedural and judiciary history behind the
anti-bootlegging statute's enactment, see infra Sections II-Ill.
16. For a review and critique of the court's analysis, see infra notes 112-207
and accompanying text.
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Moghadam's impact upon the music industry is considered in Sec-
tion VI. 17
II. FACTS
Ali Moghadam was convicted of trafficking in bootleg compact
discs containing live musical performances of popular artists.18
Moghadam pled guilty in district court but preserved his right to
appeal on the ground that his conviction derived from an unconsti-
tutional statute. 19 Specifically, Moghadam argued that Congress
lacked the constitutional authority to enact the anti-bootlegging
17. For a discussion of the impact of the Moghadam holding, see infra notes
208-18 and accompanying text.
18. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (cit-
ing criminal statute under which Moghadam was convicted). The relevant section
of 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, which is the criminal corollary to 17 U.S.C. § 1101, makes
the fixation of the "sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance"
for "purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain" a federal crime.
18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Moghadam was convicted in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, an opinion is not on
file. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1270. The particular facts behind his conviction
remain unreported by any judicial opinion.
19. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (arguing that statute did not fall under
legislative power of Congress under Article I, section 8 of United States Constitu-
tion); see also Paul Farhi, CD Bootleggers Face the Music Supply of Illegal Recordings
Shrinks After Customs Crackdown, WASH. PosT, July 14, 1997, at Al (stating "[t]hree
others [including Moghadam] are contesting the charges and awaiting trial").
Moghadam was arrested during the execution of Operation Goldmine, a sting
operation designed to capture key figures in the underground music bootleg in-
dustry. See Farhi, supra note 19, at Al. Operation Goldmine persuaded eleven
international and American bootleggers to meet a record distributor from Or-
lando, Florida. See id. Upon their arrival, the United States Customs Service ar-
rested them. See id.; see also Stan Soocher, Appeals Court Backs Anti-Bootlegging
Statute, 15 No. 3. ENT-. L. & FIN. 3, 3 (June 1999) (commenting that only
Moghadam appealed out of thirteen defendants convicted in Operation
Goldmine). Over 800,000 illegal compact discs were recovered from Orlando
warehouses. See Farhi, supra note 18, at Al. The compact discs, containing per-
formances by musical artists Tori Amos and the Beastie Boys, had a total street
value of $20 million. See Soocher, supra note 19, at 3. Interestingly, Moghadam
was the first to constitutionally challenge the federal anti-bootlegging statute given
that the first person charged under the statute was Keith Taruski in 1995. See Pat-
terson, supra note 3, at 410; Kot, supra note 6, at 1 (commenting that Taruski was
indicted and charged for illegal importation of live performance compact discs
and conspiracy).
In 1997, an Ali Moghadam, most likely the same person captured in Opera-
tion Goldmine, was arrested in Los Angeles for unauthorized copying of bootleg
performances by various musical artists. See Karen Denne, Man Denies Bootlegging
Compact Discs Worth $218,000, L.A. DAILY NEws, Oct. 17, 1992, at N3. Moghadam
allegedly ran an international distribution ring for bootleg compact discs. See id.
In just one year, Moghadam evidently manufactured over 20,000 illegal compact
discs, with over 8700 seized during his arrest. See id.
[Vol. 7: p. 327
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statute. 20 Moghadam appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit after the district court denied his mo-
tion to dismiss.21
III. BACKGROUND
The anti-bootlegging statute imposes penalties upon any unau-
thorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and videos
of live musical performances. 22 This section first examines the civil
federal anti-bootlegging statute, 17 U.S.C. § 1101.23 Next, this sec-
tion examines the criminal federal anti-bootlegging statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2319A, along with the statute's underlying constitutional
framework.24 The section concludes by exploring past case opin-
ions that examine the constitutional sources of various statutes.25
Congress, in response to the burgeoning flow of pirated mate-
rial, passed the Sound Recording Act of 1971, which granted fed-
eral copyright protection to sound recordings. 26 Unlike bootleg
recordings, sound recordings are sanctioned performances re-
20. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (reviewing respondent's argument on ap-
peal). For further discussion of the court's analysis of Moghadam's argument, see
infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
21. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (noting lower court's denial of
Moghadam's motion to dismiss indictment).
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994) (imposing civil penalties for those persons
violating statute's precepts); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (copy-
ing language of 17 U.S.C. § 1101, except imposing criminal sanctions). For the
relevant statutory language, see infra note 29.
23. For the relevant statutory language of the civil federal anti-bootlegging
statute, see infra note 29 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the federal anti-bootlegging statute and its constitu-
tional origins, see infra notes 26-92 and accompanying text. The section generally
refers to both criminal and civil codifications of the statute, unless specifically
noted otherwise.
25. For a discussion of past cases regarding the constitutional sources of vari-
ous other statutes, see infra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
26. See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (super-
seded and codified by Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994)). The
relevant portion of the 1971 statute defining sound recording:
[Granting copyright owner the exclusive right to] duplicate the sound
.. coi jn a ta__ g.blc C-m. that d;recdy or ;n-1-tly recaqptures the ac-
tual sounds fixed in the recording ....
'Sound recordings' are works that result from the fixation of a series of
musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompa-
nying a motion picture. 'Reproductions of sound recordings' are mate-
rial objects in which sounds other than those accompanying a motion
picture are fixed by any method now known or later developed ....
Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140(a) & (e), 85 Stat. 391, 391 (su-
perseded and codified by Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (7) (1994)).
See also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 563 n.17 (1973) (noting that Con-
gress was "spurred to action by the growth of record piracy .... .") (citation omit-
5
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duced to a tangible form for authorized commercial release. 27
While Congress protected sound recordings from illegal copying
and distribution, the enacted statute lacked protection for live per-
formances.28 Eventually, Congress recognized the detrimental im-
pact of bootleg recordings and enacted the first federal anti-
bootlegging statute, 17 U.S.C. § 1101; thus, Congress expanded the
scope of the antecedent Sound Recording Act of 1971.29 Section
2319A of Title 18 of the United States Code parallels § 1101, but
ted); H.R. REP. No. 92487, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567
(stating reliable trade estimates of music piracy in excess of $100 million).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (defining "sound recordings"
using identical language of Sound Recording Act of 1971).
28. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561-62 (declaring that Writing includes "any phys-
ical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor . . . . Thus,
recordings of artistic performances may be within the reach of the [Copyright
Clause]."). For a discussion of the scope of "sound recordings," see supra notes 26-
27 and accompanying text. For the definition of "bootlegging," see supra note 9
and accompanying text.
29. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994). The statute states in pertinent part:
Anyone, who, without the consent of the performer or performers in-
volved -
(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance
in a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces copies or phonorecords of such
a performance from an unauthorized fixation,
(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the sound or
sounds of a live musical performance, or
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents or offers
to rent, or traffics in any copy or phonorecord fixed as described in para-
graph (1), regardless of whether the fixations occurred in the United
States, shall be subject to [specified penalties].
17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1994).
Before enactment of federal protection, state laws existed, which protected
live performances from illegal recording. See Patterson, supra note 3, at 411 (stat-
ing that musical performers have previously used unfair competition laws and com-
mon law copyright laws for protection). Currently, thirty states and the District of
Columbia have passed anti-bootlegging statutes. See ALA. CODE § 13A-8-81 (a) (2)
(1999); ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-3705(A) (1999) (noting that "performer of live per-
formance is presumed to own rights to record performance"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
37-510(b) (1) (Michie 1999), amended by 1999 Ark. Acts 1578; CAL.. PENAL CODE
§ 653(s) & (u) (West 2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3814(b) (1999); FLA. STAT. ch.
540.11(2) (a) (3) (2000); 720 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/16-7(a) (4) (West 1999); IND.
CODE §§ 35-43-4-1 (b) (8) (B), 35434-2 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3748 (1999);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 434.445(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1999); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 223.5 (West 1999); MD. ANN. CODE § 467A(a)(2) (1999); MAss. GEN. LAws ch.
266, § 143B (1999); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 752.1052 (West 1999); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-23-87 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-142 (1999); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 352-A:2 (1999) (limited to sound recordings of performances fixed prior to
February 15, 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-21 (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-
16B-5 (Michie 1999); N.Y. PENAL Law § 275.00 (McKinney 1999) (criminalizing
unauthorized recordings of, among others, live performances); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-433(a) (1999); N.D. CEr. CODE § 47-21.1-02 (1999); OKLa. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 1978 (1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 164.869 (1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4116(d.1)
(2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-915 (Law. Co-op. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-
139 (1999); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.93 (Vernon 1999); VA. CODE ANN.
[Vol. 7: p. 327
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imposes additional criminal penalties, including a five-year prison
term for the first offense. 30 Contrary to past federal copyright pro-
tection laws, the federal anti-bootlegging statute does not rely upon
the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution. 3'
The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution allows
Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]"3 2 Two centu-
ries of judicial and legislative interpretation firmly embedded into
law the concept that copyright protection is granted only to works
"fixed" in some tangible medium. 33 This interpretation finds the
Copyright Clause incapable of granting protection to live perform-
ances as they cannot be "fixed" in some tangible medium at the
time of performance. 34 As a result, unlike traditional copyright
§ 59.1-41.2 (Michie 1999) (criminalizing unauthorized recordings of live con-
certs); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.25.030 (2000); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-50 (1999).
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The statutory language
is identical to 17 U.S.C. § 1101, except for the potential for prison and seizure and
destruction of any such copies upon conviction. See id.
31. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8E.01[C], at 8E-7 (1999) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYrMGHT] (asserting that
"support under the Copyright Clause for this amendment . . . must be dis-
counted"); Goodwin, supra note 4, at 357-58 (discussing federal anti-bootiegging
statute's constitutional deficiency as opposed to traditional copyright protection
laws); Patterson, supra note 3, at 409 (commenting that "[t]echnically, the ...
[anti-bootlegging] statute cannot classify live performances as copyrightable works,
given that musical artists never officially fix their performances in a phonorecord
as required by the Copyright Act"); Lionel S. Sobel, Bootleggers Beware Copyright Law
Now Protects Live Musical Performances But New Law Leaves Many Questions Unan-
swered, 17 No. 2 ENT. L. REP. 6, 11 (1995) (stating that "[s]ince Congress only has
the power to protect fixed works under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the
[c]onstitutional basis for Congress' power to enact the bootlegging law must be
some other provision of the Constitution."). For further discussion of the Com-
merce Clause's support of statutes related to interstate commerce, see infra notes
74-81 and accompanying text.
32. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
33. See Goldstein, 421 U.S. at 561-62 (holding that sound recordings were phys-
ical renderings within scope of "Writings" clause); cf. CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315,
320 (1st Cir. 1967) (concluding that Copyright Clause "extend[ed] to any con-
crete, describable manifestation of intellectual creation..." and thereby implying
negation of tangible form requirement). A noted commentator dismissed this
statement as dictum as the court categorized the disputed works as "Writing" within
the Copyright Clause's scope. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31,
§ 1.08[C] [2], at 1-66.30 n.35. For a discussion of the elements needed to uphold
copyright protection, see infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
34. See 3 NIMMER ON CoPWGHT, supra note 31, § 8E.02, at 8E-11 (stating that
"[g]iven the limitation of federal statutory copyright to '[W]ritings' by virtue of its
constitutional authorization, it has long been thought outside the domain of Con-
gress to accord protection to such unfixed productions."); Deas, supra note 3, at
578 (questioning use of Copyright Clause as constitutional basis for federal anti-
bootlegging clause); Goodwin, supra note 4, at 359 (commenting on federal anti-
7
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laws, the federal anti-bootlegging statute derives authority from an-
other constitutional source.3 5
A. General Background
In the past, federal law protected against the counterfeiting,
pirating and bootlegging of some types of sound recordings.3 6 Not
until 1994 did Congress enact protection for live performances. 37
Congress enacted the anti-bootlegging statute to comply with the
International Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property ("TRIPs") .3 8 The United States' participation in the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), an international
trade agreement, paved the way for establishment of TRIPs. 39 With
congressional revisions of the federal copyright protection statutes
in 1976, 1982 and 1992, the statutes remain a potent weapon in the
recording industry's war against music piracy.40
bootlegging statute's constitutional grounds). Before federal protection, states
have traditionally granted copyright protection to live performances. For further
discussion of this state protection, see supra note 29.
35. See David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1385, 1410
(1995) (commenting that "[t]he anti-bootlegging provision unquestionably vio-
lates Copyright Clause authority... ."); see also Deas, supra note 3, at 578 (stating
"short of... amending the Constitution... one must find another constitutional
mooring for [the federal anti-bootlegging statute] ... ."); Goodwin, supra note 4,
at 360 (asserting that Copyright Clause is not constitutional basis for anti-bootleg-
ging statute); Sobel, supra note 31, at 11 (concluding "the Constitutional [sic] basis
for Congress' power to enact the bootlegging law must be some other provision of
the Constitution."). For a discussion of the alternative constitutional source for
anti-bootlegging statute, see infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
36. For a discussion of the protections afforded to sound recording, see supra
note 26 and accompanying text.
37. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (1994) (criminalizing, among other ac-
tions, unsanctioned recordings of live performances). For further discussion of
copyright protection's statute history, see infra notes 41-73 and accompanying text.
38. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 8E.01 [B], at 8E-5 to 8E-6
(discussing international communities' pressure for congressional enactment of
this statute); Goodwin, supra note 4, at 350-51 (commenting that need for uniform
global intellectual property laws led to statute's enactment); Patterson, supra note
3, at 402-03 (noting inefficient prior international treaties and that growth of boot-
legging led to Uruguay Round of GATT). Composed as a requiem for those who
bootleg and distribute live performances, the statute instead raised further consti-
tutional discord. See Goodwin, supra note 4, at 355 (explaining that anti-bootleg-
ging statute differs from other copyright statutes).
39. See Goodwin, supra note 4, at 350-51. GATT is a global trade agreement
designed to promote trade among participating countries. See id. This agreement
is constantly being revised, and during the eighth cycle of negotiations, called the
Uruguay Round, participating countries addressed the issue of international pro-
tection of intellectual property rights. See id. TRIPs was the result of that negotia-
tion round, requiring that GATT countries provide copyright protection for
"sound recordings and the unauthorized fixation of live performances." Id. at 351.
40. See Patterson, supra note 3, at 385-86 (commenting on increased penalties
for violating copyright laws with each successive statute); Schwartz, supra note 4, at
[Vol. 7: p. 327
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The first copyright statute, which was passed in 1790, offered
protection only to maps, charts and books. 4 1 This statute was later
expanded to protect "any person who shall invent and design, en-
grave, etch or work.., any historical or other print or prints ....
Musical notation qualified for protection in 1831, specifically grant-
ing the copyright holder the right to sell the musical composition
score.4 3 "Typically, a copyright holder is the composition's author
or a music-publishing company."44 The performer generally did
not hold the copyright unless the performer happened to be the
composer or acquired the copyright. 4 5 The statute protected writ-
ten musical notation, but not the reproduction of actual sound, as
Edison had not yet invented the phonograph. 46
This distinction apparently confused the Supreme Court in
1908 in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.4 7 Piano rolls,
an early recording technology, are long scrolls of paper with holes
telling a "player piano" what notes to play.48 With the piano roll, a
person did not need the sheet music to appreciate the composi-
tion.49 Under the Act of 1831, the Court did not find the audible
reproduction of the musical composition via piano rolls to be a mu-
sical notation. 50 Based on this interpretation, any mechanism that
629-30 (noting that penalties for record piracy increased with passage of each
statute).
41. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 n.17 (1973) (discussing his-
torical evolution of copyright statutes in considering constitutional challenge to
state statute) (citing Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124).
42. Id. (quoting Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171).
43. See id. (citing Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870));
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 624 (noting exclusive right of copyright holder to dis-
burse protected work).
44. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 624.
45. See id. (discussing when performer could obtain copyright to musical
score).
46. See id. (noting that until Edison invented phonograph, there was little
need to protect sound reproduction).
471. 209 U.S. I (1908) (holding pianoro l. ,vere .not entitled to coprght pro-
tection, as they were not "copies" within meaning of Copyright Act); Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 624 (discussing Supreme Court's confusion between "reproduction
of actual sound" and "reproduction of written musical notation").
48. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 624 n.69 (defining "piano rolls").
49. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 564-65 (commenting on implications of piano
roll technology as noted by 1907 Congressional report).
50. See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 18 (holding, "[w]e cannot think that they are
copies within the meaning of the copyright act .... [A]s the act of Congress now
stands we believe it does not include these [piano rolls] as copies or publications
of the copyrighted music involved in these cases.").
9
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reproduced the composition's actual notes, rather than the written
musical notation, could avoid copyright infringement claims.5 1
In 1909, partly in response to the White-Smith decision, Con-
gress revised and consolidated all federal copyright statutes. 52 Con-
gress passed the Copyright Act of 1909, allowing the copyright
holder to "select the first person to preserve or 'fix' the work on a
record or musical roll."53 As long as a royalty was paid to the origi-
nal copyright holder, later performers could record their own ver-
sions of the copyrighted work.54 The Act left unclear whether a
party, without recording his or her own version, could reproduce
the original performance as long as the royalty was paid.55 The
Sound Recording Act of 1971 erased all uncertainties by granting
federal copyright protection to the reproduction of performances
in the form of actual sound recordings, assuming the performances
were previously copyrighted, but it left unanswered the legality of
recording live concert performances. 56 Twenty-three years later,
Congress addressed the live concert bootlegging issue but raised
several constitutional concerns.
57
B. Traditional Elements of the Copyright Clause
Traditionally, Congress derived authority to enact copyright
laws from the Constitution's Copyright Clause.58 The basic, neces-
51. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 624 (alluding to impact of Court's holding
regarding devices that can duplicate musical compositions' notes).
52. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 562 n.17 (stating that "[C]ongress agreed to a
major consolidation and amendment of all federal copyright statutes"); Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 625 (observing Congress' revision of copyright statutes in reaction
to White-Smith holding).
53. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 625.
54. See id. (offering example that if musician A wished to record song for
which B held copyright and B had already selected C as "the first person to pre-
serve . . . the work," then A must pay royalty to B).
55. See Patterson, supra note 3, at 382 (asserting that it was unclear "whether a
third party could legally reproduce the copyright holder's original performance by
paying the relatively inexpensive compulsory license fee rather than record his or
her own performance.") (citations omitted); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 625 (quot-
ing scholarly commentator who "believed that a third party could indeed copy the
original work by paying the compulsory license fee ... .") (citing Melville B. Nim-
mer, Photocopying and Record Piracy: Of Dred Scott and Alice in Wonderland, 22 UCLA
L. REv. 1052, 1060 (1975)).
56. See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (super-
seded by Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994)).
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994). For a discussion of alternative constitutional
sources for a statute, see infra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
58. See U.S. CONST. art, I, § 8, cl. 8. The Copyright Clause states Congress may
"promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries[.]" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. To achieve this goal, Congress
[Vol. 7: p. 327
10
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol7/iss2/6
2000] RESOLVING THE DISSONANT CONSTITUTIONAL CHORDS 337
sary element for federal copyright protection is that the work must
have an "Author" and must be a "Writing."59 Since the Constitu-
tion's passage, technological advances have forced courts to reinter-
pret continually the Copyright Clause, particularly the "Writing"
requirement. 60 In Schaab v. Kleindienst,61 the court noted signifi-
cant technological advances since the formation of the Copyright
Clause and found that the Clause "must be interpreted broadly" for
continued effectiveness. 62 In upholding the constitutionality of a
statute intended to protect sound recordings from music piracy,
Schaab set the stage for the Supreme Court's Copyright Clause in-
terpretation in Goldstein v. California.63
There are two basic prerequisites to fulfill the "Writing" clause:
intellectual labor and tangible form/fixation. 64 Inherent in the
tangible form concept, which is the focus of Moghadam, is the re-
grants authors "exclusive right to the fruits of their respective works." Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973). This right allows the author to prevent any
unauthorized copying of the work for commercial purposes. See id.
59. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 1.08[A], at 1-66.25 (assert-
ing, "Only works that qualify as writing may claim the protection of federal copy-
right legislation") (footnote omitted). This section focuses on the meaning
behind "Writings," specifically whether a live, unrecorded concert can be consid-
ered a "Writing" at the time of performance. For further discussion of the ele-
ments of a "Writing," see infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
60. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (stating that "[the 'Writing' term has] not
been construed in [its] narrow literal sense, but, rather, with the reach necessary
to reflect the broad scope of constitutional principles."); Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (granting copyright protection to
photographs and noting photography was nonexistent when Copyright Act of 1802
was passed); Reiss v. Nat'l Quotation Bureau, 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (con-
cluding that "if our Constitution embalms inflexibly the habits of 1789 [the scope
of copyright may be limited] .... But it does not; its grants of power to Congress
comprise, not only what was then known, but what the ingenuity of men should
devise thereafter."); 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 1.08[C] [2] to [F], at
1-66.30 to 1-66.38 (discussing various tangible forms that qualify as "[W]riting" in-
cluding plays and musical compositions reduced to writing); Goodwin, supra note
4, at 358-59 (commenting that definition of "Writing" has expanded beyond strict,
literal sense).
61. 345 F. Supp. 589, 590-91, per curiam (D.D.C. 1972) (ruling against motion
for injunction protesting enforcement of Sound Recording Act of 1971).
62. See id. at 590. ("The copyright clause of the Constitution must be inter-
preted broadly to provide protection for this method [of sound recordings] of
fixing creative works in tangible form."). The companies that actually "fix" musical
performances into a tangible medium therefore fit both the authorship and "Writ-
ing" requirements of the copyright clause. See id. The Schaab court found for the
respondents, upholding the constitutionality of the Sound Recording Act. See id.
at 590-91.
63. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). For further discussion of Goldstein v. California, see
infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
64. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (commenting that "'[W]ritings'... may be
interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual
or aesthetic labor").
11
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quirement that the artistic work be "fixed" in some tangible me-
dium.65 While current interpretation of medium includes a variety
of media beyond traditional print, the definition remains consistent
in mandating that the work be fixed in some discernible, corporeal
format. 66 Unless the work of art can be reduced to this tangible
medium, it remains "unfixed" and not subject to copyright protec-
tion.6 7 Eventually, courts agreed that a sound recording is a "Writ-
65. See id. at 562 (interpreting "Writing" to include any physical manifestation
of creative thought); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58
(1884) (holding that photographs are form of "Writing"); The Trade-Mark Cases,
100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (qualifying "Writing" as including only original designs de-
rived from creative and intellectual labor).
66. See Goodwin, supra note 4, at 358 (discussing consistency among tradi-
tional judicial and legislative interpretation of "Writing"). Examples of "fixed" me-
dia include phonographs, tapes and compact discs. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (6)-(7)
(1994) (stating broad categories of works granted copyright protection). This
broad interpretation of "Writing," and by implication "fixation," was not a recent
development. See Goodwin, supra note 4, at 358 (asserting that "the word
'[W] ritings' has 'always been construed to mean something that is tangible .... '")
(quoting Lionel S. Sobel, Bootleggers Beware: Copyright Law Now Protects Live Musical
Performances, But New Law Leaves Many Questions Unanswered, 17 No. 2 ENT. L. REP.
6, 11 (1995)).
In 1884, the Supreme Court in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, granted
Copyright Clause protection to the works of photographers. 111 U.S. 53, 58
(1884) (holding, "We entertain no doubt that the Constitution is broad enough to
cover an act authorizing copyright of photographs, so far as they are representa-
tives of original intellectual conceptions of the author."). This case concerned a
suit filed by Sarony, a photographer, against Burrow-Giles, a lithography company,
for infringement of a Sarony photograph. See id. at 54. Burrow-Giles contested the
constitutionality of a statute granting photographs copyright protection, specifi-
cally asserting that a photograph was not an original work of art, but a mere repro-
duction of some feature. See id. at 56. The Court, analyzing the past legislative
history of the Copyright Clause, analogized photographs with "maps, charts, de-
signs, engravings, etchings, cuts, and other prints" and could not find a reason to
excise photographs from the melange of other artistic works granted copyright
protection. Id. at 57-58. As long as some original facet of the photograph was
discernible, the Court concluded that copyright protection must be granted. See
id. at 60. This case expanded the definition of "Writings" to include "all forms of
writing... by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expres-
sion." See Sarony, 111 U.S. at 58. Note that the photograph was a portrait of Oscar
Wilde, and the Court left unanswered whether "ordinary" photographs warranted
copyright protection. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 1.08[B], at 1-
66.26 n.13.
67. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561-62 (declaring that "physical rendering of the
fruits of creative ... labor" was "Writing" subject to copyright protection); 1 NiM-
MER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 1.08[C] [2], at 1-66.30 (noting that writing "to
be given any meaning whatsoever, it must, at the very least, denote 'some material
form, capable of identification and having a more or less permanent endur-
ance.'") (quoting Canadian Admiral Corp. v. Rediffusion, Inc., Can. Exch. 382,
383 (1954)); cf CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 1967) (implying nega-
tion of tangible form requirement by holding "Writing" to include "any concrete,
describable manifestation of intellectual creation"). For a refutation of the DeCosta
implication, see supra note 33.
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ing" entitled to Copyright Clause protection.68 Congress implicitly
expanded the scope of "Writing" to include, among other things,
motion pictures, sound recordings and choreographic works.69
The Supreme Court considered whether musical concert re-
cordings fell under the auspices of the Copyright Clause in Goldstein
v. California.70 In Goldstein, the petitioners illegally copied and dis-
tributed for sale audiotapes of popular musical performances.7 ' In
examining the "Writing" concept, the Court concluded that, "al-
though the word '[W]riting' might be limited to script or printed
material, it may be interpreted to include any physical rendering of
the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor. ' 72 "Fixation,"
therefore, results when the "Writing" is reduced to the physical
medium. v3
C. The Commerce Clause: An Alternative Constitutional Source
If the Copyright Clause fails to support constitutionally a stat-
ute, other constitutional clauses may support that statute, particu-
larly the Commerce Clause.74 In considering whether copyright
68. See Schaab v. Kleindienst, 345 F. Supp. 589, 590 (D.D.C. 1972) (noting
that as technical advances form basis of sound recording industry, broad interpre-
tation of Copyright Clause is required).
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (noting eight categories of authorship
granted copyright protection).
70. 412 U.S. 546, 562 (1973).
71. See id. at 549-50 (discussing petitioners' piracy operation, noting that peti-
tioners would purchase single authorized recording, illegally duplicate it and dis-
tribute copies to retail outlets for public consumption).
72. Id. at 561 (citations omitted); see also 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note
31, § 1.08[C] [2], at 1-66.30 n.34 (citing past cases interpreting "Writing" as requir-
ing some tangible form).
73. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (noting that "Writing" encompasses physical
manifestations of intellectual labor); see also 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note
31, § 1.08[C] [2], at 1-66.31 n.38 (asserting that fixation results under Copyright
Act when work is embodied in relatively permanent physical medium). Nimmer
continues, quoting legislative discussion stressing the need for a further qualifica-
tion of the fixation concept given the transient nature of such display and storage
technologies as televisions and computers. See id. (citing H.R. 2237, 89th Cong.,
(2d Sess. 1966)).
74. For a discussion of the Commerce Clause and relevant case law, see infra
notes 82-111 and accompanying text.
Mere failure by Congress to cite a constitutional clause as authoritative sup-
port for a statute does not necessarily invalidate that statute. See Woods v. Cloyd W.
Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (stating "[t]he question of the constitutional-
ity of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it
undertakes to exercise."). Woods sustained continued rent control provisions en-
acted during World War II, under the War Powers Act, despite the war's end. See
id at 142 (concluding that acts enacted under war power " [do] not necessarily end
with the cessation of hostilities"); cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565-66
(1995) (invalidating statute prohibiting gun possession in school zones despite ex-
13
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statutes fall within Commerce Clause authority, the scope of that
clause must be examined under the leading case of United States v.
Lopez. 75 In Lopez, the Court considered whether Congress exceeded
its Commerce Clause constitutional limits in enacting the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 ("Gun-Free Act") .76 The Gun-Free Act
made it a federal crime to possess a gun within a school zone. 77
The respondent contested his conviction, asserting that the Gun-
Free Act was unconstitutional legislation under the Commerce
Clause. 78 The Supreme Court agreed, ruling that the activity of car-
rying a gun did not substantially affect interstate commerce. 79 In so
ruling, the Court established three categories of activities under
which Congress may regulate interstate commerce. 80 Generally, if a
plicit congressional invocation of Commerce Clause as constitutional support); Ry.
Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 473 (1982) (declining to use
Commerce Clause to uphold statute which violated Bankruptcy Clause).
75. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
76. See id. at 566 (discussing whether statute banning gun possession in school
zones exceeded Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce).
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2) (A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) ("It shall be unlaw-
ful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm . . .[in] a school zone."). A
school zone is "in ... or within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a...
school." Id. § 921(a) (25).
78. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (noting that "[o]n appeal, respondent chal-
lenged his conviction based on his claim that § 9 22(q) exceeded Congress' power
to legislate under the Commerce Clause.").
79. See id. at 567-68 (holding Gun-Free Act failed test of whether regulated
activity substantially affected interstate commerce). Specifically, the Court focused
on the nature of the underlying activity. See 1 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW, § 5-4 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that Court in Lopez wanted "to focus
more attention on the nature of the underlying activity - paying particular attention to
whether or not that activity could itself be described as part of an economic enter-
prise.") (emphasis in original). The statute would be sustained if the regulated
activity was commercial or economic in nature and substantially affected interstate
commerce. See id. (suggesting that statute meeting Lopez criteria would pass consti-
tutional scrutiny).
80. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (identifying three categories of activities that
Congress may regulate under Commerce Power).
The first category of activities that Congress may regulate are those affecting
"channels of interstate commerce." Id. at 558 (citations omitted). Channels of
commerce may be analogized to a "river of commerce" that Congress controls by
excluding any good deemed unfit. See TRIBE, supra note 79, § 5-5. Second, Con-
gress may "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. (citations omit-
ted). Finally, Congress may regulate "activities having a substantial relation to in-
terstate commerce." Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted). Specifically, the third
category requires that the activity "substantially affect" interstate commerce. See id.
at 559 (noting unclear prior case law in determining necessary legal factors for
constitutional analysis of regulated activities); TRIBE, supra note 79, § 5-5 (stating
that "the 'substantial effects' requirement applies only to the third category; the
first two categories, by definition, substantially affect - because they are components of
- interstate commerce.") (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Robertson,
514 U.S. 669 (1995)).
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statute relates to interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause pro-
vides sufficient constitutional authority.81
D. Congressional Intent and the Commerce Clause
Legislative findings assist courts in determining the congres-
sional intent of a statute. 82 In United States v. Viscome,83 the Eleventh
Circuit granted substantial deference to congressional findings in
determining whether a statute met the Lopez criteria.8 4 In Viscome,
Noting that Lopez merely imposed "outer limits" to Congress' Commerce
Clause regulatory authority, the United States v. Wright court determined a statute's
constitutionality by considering whether a rational basis existed for concluding
that a regulated activity "substantially affected interstate commerce." 117 F.3d
1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 1997), vacated in part on other grounds, 133 F.3d 1412 (11th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 894 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
557 (1995)) (discussing standard under which statute will survive constitutional
scrutiny). Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) makes it a federal crime for any person to trans-
fer or possess a machine gun. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994). Wright concerned a
constitutional challenge to Congress criminalizing the possession of machine guns.
See Wright, 117 F.3d at 1267. Similar to Lopez, the respondent asserted that Con-
gress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause to regulate machine gun
possession. See id. at 1268-69. Specifically, Wright asserted that, similar to the stat-
ute at issue in Lopez, there was no justification for this statute under the Commerce
Clause because no legislative findings and no jurisdictional element existed
describing a connection between gun possession and interstate commerce. See id.
at 1268.
In denying respondent's claim, the court distinguished the statute in Wright,
which represented a total ban on the possession of machine guns, from the statute
in Lopez, which prohibited gun possession only within school zones. See id. at 1270
(disagreeing with Wright's argument and sustaining statute's constitutionality).
The court noted machine gun regulation qualified as an activity substantially af-
fecting interstate commerce. See id. Finally, the Wright court found the statute had
a direct connection with interstate commerce, thereby finding sufficient Congres-
sional authority to regulate machine gun possession. See id.
81. See TRIBE, supra note 79, § 5-4 (noting that "[i]n essence . .. the power to
regulate 'commerce' necessarily encompasses power ... over all activities that are
themselves part of the production or distribution of wealth in the broadest eco-
nomic sense of that term .... ").
82. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (agreeing that while Congress need not make
"formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate
commerce," such findings "would enable [the Court] to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate
commerce . . . ").
In Cheffer v. Reno, the court examined the constitutional validity of a statute
imposing civil and criminal penalties upon anyone threatening harm upon a per-
son obtaining or providing reproductive health services. See 55 F.3d 1517, 1519
(1lth Cir. 1995). The Cheffer court sustained the constitutionality of the statute,
noting the legislative findings on record assisted the court in finding the regulated
activity has substantial impact upon interstate commerce. See id. at 1520 (noting
"extensive legislative findings support Congress' conclusion that the [statute at is-
sue] regulates activity which substantially affects interstate commerce.").
83. 144 F.3d 1365 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 941 (1998).
84. See id. at 1371 (granting deference to explicit findings of Congress that
use of weapons of mass destruction substantially affected interstate commerce).
15
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similar to Lopez, the respondent challenged the constitutionality of
the Commerce Clause-based statute imposing his conviction.8 5 In
upholding the statute's constitutionality, the Viscome court distin-
guished the Lopez holding, noting that, unlike Lopez, Congress made
findings about the regulated activity's impact upon interstate
commerce.
8 6
In addition to legislative findings, the existence of a jurisdic-
tional element in a statute may assist a court in determining a stat-
The Viscome court's legislative deference derived from Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (noting
that "[i ] n reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, 'courts must accord substan-
tial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress.'") (quoting Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 665).
Turner challenged the constitutionality of a provision requiring television
cable operators to carry local broadcast television stations. See id. at 185. In up-
holding the provision's constitutionality, the Court relied heavily upon congres-
sional findings. See id. at 195 (concluding that Court's "sole obligation is 'to assure
that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences
based on substantial evidence.'") (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 666).
This deference was owed to the legislature's greater capacity to assimilate and eval-
uate data concerning legislative issues. See id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512
U.S. at 665-66) (citations omitted).
85. See Viscome, 144 F.3d at 1370. Gentile, a Viscome defendant, was convicted
of violating a statute making it a criminal offense for anyone to use weapons of
mass destruction. See id. Gentile was convicted of violating Title 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332a(a) (2), which states: "A person who uses, or attempts or conspires to use, a
weapon of mass destruction ... against any person within the United States ...
shall be imprisoned . . . ." See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a) (2) (1994)). Con-
gress later amended the statute to include an element requiring the government
to show that "the results of such use affect ... or would have affected interstate or
foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a) (2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Viscome, 144
F.3d at 1370 (noting in April 1996, Congress amended 1994 statute to include
interstate commerce element). Gentile asserted that because the unamended stat-
ute lacked the "interstate commerce" element, the conviction was invalid. See Vs-
come, 144 F.3d at 1370.
86. See Viscome, 144 F.3d at 1371 (commenting that "Congress finds that the
use... of weapons of mass destruction.., seriously affect[s] interstate and foreign
commerce .... ") (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-405, at 46 (1991)); Wright, 117
F.3d 1265, 1269 (rejecting argument that required "[C]ongress to place ajurisdic-
tional element in every statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause .... ")
(citing United States v. Olin, 107 F.3d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1997)). Based upon
past congressional experience in regulating such weapons, the Viscome court
abided by the Turner Court's reasoning and granted substantial deference to Con-
gress' findings. See Viscome, 144 F.3d at 1371 (stating that "[c]onsidering Con-
gress'[ ] experience in regulating explosives and their effects, we accord these
findings substantial deference."). The Viscome court also noted that the statute in
question, unlike Lopez, completely regulated the activity and did not attempt to
decide case-by-case whether the facts supported an impact upon interstate com-
merce. See id. (noting that statute at issue in Lopez statute did not contain "inter-
state nexus" requirement ensuring case-by-case inquiry into whether firearm
possession affected interstate commerce).
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ute's Commerce Clause validity.8 7 The absence of a jurisdictional
element forces courts to determine independently whether the reg-
ulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 88 Under
this analysis, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Olin§9 declined
to overturn the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") on constitutional grounds.90
The court noted that even lacking that jurisdictional element, the
statute fell within the Lopez requirements. 91 Assuming that a statute
exceeds the constitutional limitations of one clause, the court must
determine whether Congress may pass that statute under a second
constitutional clause, if that statute meets the second clause's
requirements. 92
E. Choosing One Constitutional Clause Over Another
The Supreme Court considered choosing one constitutional
clause over another in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States93
when it declined to hold the public accommodation sections of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 unconstitutional, despite the fact that simi-
lar provisions were ruled unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
87. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (distinguishing prior case by noting that instant
statute had "no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to [activi-
ties] ... hav[ing] an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.").
88. See United States v. Olin, 107 F.3d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding
that missing jurisdictional element forced courts to determine independently
whether statute substantially affected interstate commerce). Olin, a chemical
plant operator, contaminated portions of the land around the plant. See id. at
1508. The federal government filed suit against Olin under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), and Olin
responded by challenging CERCLA's constitutionality on Commerce Clause
grounds. See id.
89. 107 F.3d 1506 (l1th Cir. 1997).
90. See id. at 1510 (noting that missing legislative findings or jurisdictional
element did not preclude constitutional soundness of contested legislation).
91. See id. (upholding constitutionality of CERCLA despite lack of legislative
findings and jurisdictional element). The Olin court found that despite the ab-
sence of !eislative findings and a jurisdictional element, CERCLA regulates activi-
ties substantially affecting interstate commerce. See id. at 1510 (stating "[CERCLA]
remain[ed] valid . . .because it regulate[d] a class of activities that substantially
affects interstate commerce."). Olin also noted that while CERCLA lacks formal
legislative findings, the Supreme Court had used such findings from antecedent
statutes. See id. at 1510 n.6.
92. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
For a discussion of the Heart of Atlanta Motel decision, see infra notes 94-96 and
accompanying text.
93. 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (sustaining constitutional validity of certain sections
of Civil Rights Act of 1964 despite similar provisions constitutionally overruled in
prior case).
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Amendment in the Civil Rights Cases.94 The Court in Heart of At-
lanta Motel did so without directly overturning that earlier case. 95
Given the close parallel between the two sets of Civil Rights Acts
provisions in both cases, it appears that a statute invalid under one
constitutional clause may be valid under another.96
94. See id. at 250-51 (noting similar civil rights provision were found constitu-
tionally deficient in 1883). In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court found that
civil rights provisions enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1875 exceeded the Four-
teenth Amendment's legislative bounds. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25
(1883) (asserting that no "authority for the passage of the law in question can be
found in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution;
and no other ground of authority for its passage being suggested, it must . .. be
declared void .... ."). The Civil Rights Cases Court did not, as noted by the Heart of
Atlanta Motel Court, determine if the Commerce Clause could sustain those provi-
sions. See Heart of Atlanta Mote4 379 U.S. at 251 (noting "the fact that certain kinds
of business may not in 1875 have been sufficiently involved in interstate commerce
to warrant bringing them within the ambit of the commerce power is not necessa-
rily dispositive of the same question today.").
The Civil Rights Cases considered the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of
1875. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9. The Act forbade illegal racial dis-
crimination against individuals exercising their right to use public accommoda-
tions. See id. at 9-10. Public accommodations included inns, public conveyances,
theaters and other places of public amusement. See id. at 9 (citing Civil Rights Act
of 1875, 18 Stat. 335). The Court declared the provisions unconstitutional because
they went beyond Congress' authority to regulate private conduct via the Four-
teenth Amendment. See id. at 11 (concluding statute at issue violated Fourteenth
Amendment because "[ilt nullified and [made] void all State legislation, and State
action of every kind, which impair[ed] the privileges and immunities of
citizens. .. ").
95. See Heart of Atlanta Motel 379 U.S. at 250 (declining to overtum Civil Rights
Cases, considering that decision without precedential value for instant case). The
Court found sufficient constitutional authority for the statute under the Com-
merce Clause. See id. at 258 (noting, "the power of Congress to promote interstate
commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents ... which might
have had a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce.").
96. See id. at 250-52 (stepping through analysis that sustained, under one
clause, the constitutionality of statute similar to statute held unconstitutional
under different clause). The Civil Rights Cases Court could not apply the modem
Commerce Clause analysis. See id. at 251 (noting overly broad nature of 1875 Act
in Civil Rights Cases, which affected businesses that may not have engaged in inter-
state commerce, given state of transportation technology in nineteenth century).
With nine decades of technological achievement, the Court noted that businesses
formerly unaffected by the 1875 Act may now be subject to the 1964 Act. See Heart
of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 251 (stating that, at that time, nineteenth century busi-
nesses "may not have been sufficiently involved in interstate commerce"). Given
that (a) the Civil Rights Cases Court did not fully apply the Commerce Clause analy-
sis to the 1875 Act and (b) the Heart of Atlanta Court declined to consider whether
the 1964 Act is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, there still re-
mains an implicit assumption that legislation breaking constitutional boundaries
under one clause "has no bearing on whether it can be sustained under another
[clause]." United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).
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The Trade-Mark [sic] Cases97 applied this analysis in resolving a
trademark protection statute's constitutionality. 98 The statute pro-
tected trademarks from, among other things, counterfeiting.99 The
defendants contested their convictions, arguing that there was no
legislative authority to enact the statute.100 The government re-
sponded by asserting the Copyright Clause, or in the alternative, by
stating that the Commerce Clause provided sufficient authority for
statutory passage.' 01 The Court held it could not sustain the trade-
mark statute under either the Copyright Clause or the Commerce
Clause, thus recognizing the possibility of alternative constitutional
support for a statute. 10 2
Almost a century later, the Second Circuit applied this analysis
in its determination of a copyright statute's constitutionality in Au-
97. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
98. See id. at 93-95 (considering whether statute derived its constitutional au-
thority from Copyright Clause or Commerce Clause). The government asserted
that either the Copyright or Commerce Clause could sustain the statute's constitu-
tionality. See id. at 93.
99. See Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141 (granting protection to
trademarks against counterfeiting). Specifically, the defendants were convicted of,
among other things, forging trademarks belonging to foreign and domestic manu-
facturers of liquor. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 82-83. The imitation
trademarks were used to delude customers as to the actual origin of champagne or
whiskey sold by defendants. See id.
100. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 91-92 (inquiring whether trademark
statute derived from constitutionally granted authority).
101. See id. at 86-87 (specifying government's two pronged argument in justi-
fying enactment of trademark protection statute). While appellant failed with this
argument here, it presaged the one used in Moghadam. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at
1271 (discussing government's argument which closely paralleled that from Trade-
Marks Cases).
102. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 98-99 (holding that trademarks lack
elements necessary to grant Copyright Clause protection). Trademarks, unlike
copyrights, do not promote the sciences or the arts; thus, under the 1876 Act,
originality was not necessary to register a trademark. See id. at 93-94.
The Court declined to analyze the statute's constitutionality under the Com-
merce Clause, claiming that the statute regulated "commerce wholly between citi-
zcs f hcsameSe, s1  -,L,. tmho s .J. .a power not confided to Congress."
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 96-97; TRiBE, supra note 79, § 5-4 (noting statute
did not qualify for Commerce Clause support, so Court felt no need to define
congressional limits of power under Commerce Clause). Tribe concluded that
"[tihe Trade-Mark Cases are notable . .. because of [the Court's] expressed reluc-
tance to find that Congress was attempting to exercise its commerce power inas-
much as Congress had not said it was making such attempt." Id. (emphasis in
original). The lack of a jurisdictional element that would qualify the statute for
Commerce Clause protection was not conducive in the Court's analysis. See The
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 97 ("Here is no requirement that such person [in-
volved in trademark activity protected by the statute] shall be engaged in the kind
of commerce which Congress is authorized to regulate.").
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thors League of America, Inc. v. Oman.103 The plaintiff asserted, inter
alia, that the statute could not derive its constitutional authority
from the Copyright Clause. 10 4 The court rejected the plaintiffs
constitutional attack, concluding that while the statute may exceed
Congress' Copyright Clause power, other sources of congressional
power justified the statute's enactment. 10 5 This line of cases,
namely Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Trade-Mark Cases and Authors
League, hold that one clause may constitutionally support a statute
that fails under the other clause's scrutiny. 10 6
These cases, however, contradict the Supreme Court's holding
in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons ('Railway"). 107 The stat-
ute at issue in Railway conflicted with the Bankruptcy Clause's uni-
formity provision.' 08 The Court declined to find the statute
103. 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986). The statute at issue, which has now lapsed,
protected the domestic book publishing and printing industries by restricting "im-
portation of copyrighted, foreign-manufactured, non-dramatic, literary works." Id.
at 221.
104. See id. at 221 (stating plaintiffs constitutional arguments against clause
based upon First and Fifth Amendments). The plaintiffs argued that the statute
interfered with the Copyright Clause's purpose which was to promote the progress
of useful arts. See id. at 224.
105. See id. (commenting that plaintiff failed to realize that Copyright Clause
was not only constitutional source of congressional power). The court noted that
the statute, regulating imports of foreign works, could derive authority from the
Commerce Clause. See Authors League of America, 790 F.2d at 224 ("[D]enial of
copyright protection . . . is clearly justified as an exercise of the legislature's power
to regulate commerce . . ").
106. For a further examination of this line of cases, see supra notes 93-105 and
accompanying text.
107. 455 U.S 457, 471 (1982) (asserting that if statute were upheld, Bank-
ruptcy Clause's uniformity provision would become meaningless). In 1975, the
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co. ("Rock Island"), received district
court permission for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act. See id. at 459.
Rock Island continued to operate under the Act until September 1979, when Rock
Island ceased operation due to a labor strike. See id. Consequently, the District
Court ordered asset liquidation. See id In June 1980, the court ordered that for-
mer employees could not make any claims upon the liquidation proceeds. See id.
at 460. Congress, six days prior, however, enacted a statute ordering the railroad
to pay $75 million to former employees. See Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 455 U.S. at
461-62 (noting congressional passage of Rock Island Railroad Transition and Em-
ployee Assistance Act ("RITA"), providing economic and employment assistance to
former employees). The Act ordered that those former employees who were still
unemployed be paid $75 million. See 45 U.S.C. § 1008 (repealed 1983); Ry. Labor
Executives'Ass'n, 455 U.S. at 462 n.3 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 1008).
108. See Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 455 U.S. at 469 (noting that bankruptcy
laws must be uniform throughout United States). The Bankruptcy Clause's uni-
formity provision requires any congressional statute to apply equally among classes
of debtors, otherwise discrimination among debtors and creditors would result. See
id. (noting also that clause prohibits Congress "from treating railroad bankruptcies
as a distinctive problem"); TRIBE, supra note 79, § 5-8 (noting congressional bank-
ruptcy statute cannot apply to one debtor or discriminate among regional debtors
and creditors). The District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, holding
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constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 10 9 In so ruling, the
Court noted that use of the Commerce Clause as an alternative con-
stitutional source for a statute "would eradicate from the Constitu-
tion a limitation on the power of the Congress to enact bankruptcy
laws." 110 This case, while limited to bankruptcy law, exemplifies
how a court may decline to sustain constitutionally a statute under
an alternative clause when that statute fails initial constitutional
scrutiny."'
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A copyright statute's legality must hew to past judicial interpre-
tation of the Copyright Clause or otherwise fall before a constitu-
tional challenge. 112 If the anti-bootlegging statute, relying upon
the Copyright Clause, fails to comport with past judicial interpreta-
tion of the clause, then the statute must look elsewhere to find con-
stitutional redemption. 113  In United States v. Moghadam, the
respondent asserted that Congress exceeded its constitutional au-
thority by enacting the anti-bootlegging statute. 114 The govern-
ment countered, claiming that either the Copyright Clause or the
RITA constitutionally unacceptable. See Ry. Labor Executives'Ass'n, 455 U.S. at 464-
65 (citations omitted).
109. See Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 455 U.S. at 471 ("The language of the
Bankruptcy Clause itself compels us to hold that such a bankruptcy law is not
within the power of Congress to enact."). To sustain this statute, the Court held,
would enable discriminatory private bills that could favor some individual debtors
over others. See id.
110. Id. at 469 (exploring history behind Bankruptcy Clause's uniformity
clause and concluding that individualized nature of RITA bars judicial approval).
Further, the Court noted that "if we were to hold that Congress had the power to
enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would
eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress to enact
bankruptcy laws." See id. at 468-69.
111. For a discussion of the significance of Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, gee
infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
112. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (noting respondent's challenge to anti-
bootlegging statute's constitutionality on grounds that it exceeded Congress' au-
thority to regulate copyrights).
113. SPP id. at 1273 ("This positive grant of legislative authority [of the Copy-
right Clause to protect works] includes several limitations."); Deas, supra note 3, at
578 (asserting that as statute is outside purview of Copyright Clause, another "con-
stitutional mooring" must be found); Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1411 (concluding
statute "must not be rooted in the Copyright Clause"); Sobel, supra note 31, at 11-
12 ("[A]nother Constitutional basis for [the anti-bootlegging statute] must be
found."); Goodwin, supra note 4, at 357-58 (asserting that anti-bootlegging statute
cannot derive constitutional authority from Copyright Clause).
114. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271-73. Some of the enumerated powers
granted to Congress include the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce
("Commerce Clause") and the granting of patents and copyrights ("Copyright
Clause"). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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Commerce Clause provided sufficient constitutional authority for
enactment of the federal anti-bootlegging statute. 1 5 With the mo-
tion to dismiss denied by the district court, Moghadam reasserted
this argument before the Eleventh Circuit.1 16 The Eleventh Circuit
upheld the conviction, affirming the district court's dismissal of
Moghadam's constitutional challenge.11 7
In so ruling, the court distinguished between two lines of cases
that conflicted regarding whether Congress may use one clause to
enact a statute barred by another clause.118 The court found that
Congress could use other constitutional clauses, such as the Com-
merce Clause, to grant "copyright-like" protection to works that
might not meet the full requirements of the Copyright Clause. 119
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Commerce Clause pro-
vides sufficient authority for the federal anti-bootlegging statute. 120
The Moghadam court first considered the federal anti-bootleg-
ging statute's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. 121 The
court then ascertained whether Congress could pass a law under
the Commerce Clause to avoid obstacles raised by the Copyright
Clause. 122 The Moghadam court concluded by resolving the stat-
ute's constitutionality under the Copyright and Commerce
115. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (summarizing government's argument
that statute is valid under one of two constitutional clauses).
116. See id. (stating procedural basis for Moghadam's appearance before Elev-
enth Circuit).
117. See id. (rejecting Moghadam's appeal of district court's motion to dismiss
indictment).
118. See id. at 1279-80 (recognizing "tension" between two lines of cases, with
one line asserting that, where Copyright Clause might bar statute, Commerce
Clause may be used to uphold that statute and other line contesting that asser-
tion). For further discussion of this conflict of case law, see infra notes 121-25 and
accompanying text.
119. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (1999) (stating, "We
hold that the Copyright Clause does not envision that Congress is positively forbid-
den from extending copyright-like protection under other constitutional clauses,
such as the Commerce Clause, to works of authorship that may not meet the fixa-
tion requirement inherent in the term 'Writings.'").
120. See id. at 1282 (summing up reasons for upholding anti-bootlegging stat-
ute's constitutionality and Moghadam's conviction). For further discussion of the
Eleventh Circuit's methodology, see infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
121. See id. at 1280 (noting that in this instance, use of Commerce Clause was
acceptable because Copyright Clause could not affirm anti-bootlegging statute's
constitutionality). For further discussion of the court's Commerce Clause analysis,
see infra notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
122. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1282 (holding anti-bootlegging statute met
Commerce Clause Lopez requirements). The court assumed arguendo that the
Commerce Clause could not be used to avoid a Copyright Clause restriction,
where the restriction conflicts with a particular Commerce Clause facet. See id. at
1280 n.12. For further discussion of the court's analysis in Moghadam, see infra
notes at 152-58 and accompanying text.
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Clauses.1 23 The bulk of the court's analysis laid in determining
when Congress may constitutionally validate a statute under one
clause to avoid the restrictions of another clause that would pre-
clude validity. 124 As this was an issue of first impression, the Elev-
enth Circuit looked to analysis from analogous past cases. 125
A. The Copyright Clause May Not Constitutionally Sustain the
Anti-Bootlegging Statute
The Eleventh Circuit began by analyzing the anti-bootlegging
statute's constitutionality under the Copyright Clause.1 26 The court
noted that past congressional and judiciary interpretations imposed
several restrictions upon the clause. 127 Given those limitations, the
court considered whether the Copyright Clause could be a constitu-
tional source of the anti-bootlegging statute. 128
The Supreme Court indirectly addressed the issue of whether a
sound recording, but not a bootleg, was entitled to copyright pro-
tection in Goldstein v. California.129 The Court sustained a state stat-
ute granting copyright protection to sound recordings. 130 If the
anti-bootlegging statute, protecting live performances from unau-
thorized recordings, derived authority from the Copyright Clause,
but failed to meet the clause's elements, then Moghadam's convic-
tion was unconstitutional.' 3'
The Moghadam court therefore examined the issue of whether
a live musical performance qualifies as a "Writing."132 Noting that
123. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1273-76 (analyzing anti-bootlegging statute's
constitutionality under Copyright and Commerce Clauses).
124. See id. at 1277-81 (discussing whether Congress may use Commerce
Clause power to avoid Copyright Clause restrictions).
125. See id. at 1271 ("The constitutionality of the anti-bootlegging statute ap-
pears to be a question of first impression in the nation.").
126. See id. at 1273 ("Our analysis of the constitutionality of [the anti-bootleg-
ging statute] begins with the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution.").
127. See id. at 1273-74 (discussing inherent aspects of Copyright Clause, in-
cluding concepts of "Writing," fixation and tangible form).
128. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1273-74 (noting that Moghadam's argument
was based upon pastjudicial interpretation of Copyright Clause).
129. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). For a discussion of
the Goldstein holding, see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
130. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 560 (concluding "the language of the Constitu-
tion neither explicitly precludes the States from granting copyrights nor grants
such authority exclusively to the Federal government.").
131. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (noting Moghadam's motion to dismiss
indictment on grounds that anti-bootlegging statute was unconstitutional under
Copyright Clause).
132. See id. at 1274 (discussing Moghadam's argument that live performance
was not fixed in some tangible medium at time of performance).
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fixation is among the Copyright Clause's limitations, Moghadam as-
serted that, as the anti-bootlegging statute failed to abide by that
concept, the statute was void.' 33 No cases have held directly that
every "Writing" must be "fixed" in a tangible form in order to ob-
tain copyright protection, though it had been strongly suggested.1
3 4
Every successive statutory revision of the copyright laws has re-
quired some form of "fixation" for the work to qualify for copyright
protection. 13 5 Over a century ago, the court in Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphic Co. v. Sarony noted such a fixation.136 More recently, the
Court in Goldstein interpreted "Writing" to encompass "any physical
rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor,"
concluding that artistic performance recordings may fall under the
Copyright Clause's protections. 13 7 A year after Goldstein, a district
court agreed with that assessment, noting, "it is now clear, then,
that a writing may be perceptible either visually or aurally."138 Yet,
these holdings did not directly qualify live musical performances as
within the Copyright Clause's protective scope and the Moghadam
court declined to hold otherwise. 139
133. See id. at 1273 (commenting that Moghadam relied upon fixation con-
cept as core of argument against constitutionality of anti-bootlegging statute).
134. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 1.08[C] [2], at 1-66.30 (as-
serting that no cases have directly held that for work to be "Writing" it must be in
some tangible form).
135. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 (noting that work must be reduced to
some physical rendering of Authors creativity and originality).
136. 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (holding photographs are protected by copyright as
long as some smidgen of originality exists). For a discussion of the Burrow-Giles
holding, see supra note 66.
137. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561-62 (noting sound recordings fall under that
definition).
138. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.08[B], at 1-66.27; see also Schaab v. Klein-
dienst, 345 F. Supp. 589, 590 (D.D.C. 1972).
139. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 (declining to decide whether fixation
requirement included live performances). The court did not formally hold the
federal anti-bootlegging statute unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause. See
id. A noted copyright law commentator agreed with Moghadam's assertion that a
live performance is not in a tangible form at the time of performance. See
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 ("[N]o respectable interpretation of the word 'writ-
ings' embraces an untaped performance of someone singing at Carnegie Hall.")
(alteration in original) (quoting Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1409). "But for the
bootlegger's decision to record," Moghadam argued, "a live performance is fleet-
ing and evanescent." Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274.
The Moghadam court also noted that the anti-bootlegging statute's lack of a
copyright time limit conflicts with the Copyright Clause's requirement that protec-
tion be extended only for "Limited Times." See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 n.9.
The court chose not to address this issue as Moghadam apparently did not pre-
serve that argument. See id. At oral argument, the court apparently addressed this
issue extensively. See Appeals Court Backs Anti-Bootlegging Statute, 15 No. 3. ENr. L. &
FIN. 3, 3 (June 1999) (quoting Moghadam's counsel, David A. Nickerson, "This
[issue] was discussed a lot during oral arguments. The next case that comes along
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B. The Anti-Bootlegging Statute Harmonizes
With the Commerce Clause
With the anti-bootlegging statute lacking the "fixation" ele-
ment, the Eleventh Circuit examined the Commerce Clause to de-
termine if a more harmonious chord could be struck.1 40 The court
turned to the Lopez case to locate the standard for determining the
constitutional sufficiency necessary to sustain the federal anti-boot-
legging statute. 141 Lopez identified three categories of activities that
Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause. 142
The Moghadam court concluded that the federal anti-bootleg-
ging statute fell under the third category of "intrastate activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce." 143 To qualify for the
third category, the court concluded that a rational basis must exist
to support the contention that the regulated activity substantially
affects interstate commerce. 44 A rational basis, supporting the re-
lationship between the activity and interstate commerce, may be
found by examining legislative history and any statutory jurisdic-
tional elements. 145
is going to seize on [that "Limited Times" argument in arguing the anti-bootleg-
ging statute unconstitutional]").
140. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 (applying Commerce Clause scrutiny in
determining anti-bootlegging statute's constitutionality).
141. See id. at 1275 (concluding Lopez is most appropriate case to apply to
instant facts).
142. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). For further dis-
cussion of the three categories which are appropriately regulated under the Com-
merce Clause, see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
143. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 (stating, "our analysis here focuses on
the third category of appropriate legislation"). The Moghadam court noted the
"obviousness" of the link between bootleg compact discs and interstate commerce,
concluding that if bootlegging is done for financial gain, it affects commerce. See
id. at 1276. For a discussion of the interaction between bootlegging and com-
merce, see supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
144. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. That rational basis must form an apparent
relationship demonstrating the regulated activity's impact upon interstate com-
merce. See United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 1997). For
further discussion of the rational basis, see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
145. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274-76 (discussing factors that would sustain
constitutionality under Commerce Clause). The Moghadam court deferred to the
Viscome court's finding granting substantial deference to legislative findings in eval-
uating whether the statute met Lopez criteria. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 (not-
ing that Wright commented that lack of legislative findings on record did not
negate constitutionality); United States v. Viscome, 144 F.3d 1365 (11th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 941 (1998) (noting legislative findings important in upholding
constitutionality of statute). The court in Viscome, similar to Lopez, assessed a stat-
ute's constitutionality under which the appellee was convicted. See Viscome, 144
F.3d at 1370-71 (upholding statute's constitutionality noting that, unlike Lopez,
Congress made findings on impact of regulated activity upon interstate
commerce).
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The Moghadam court examined the federal anti-bootlegging
statute and found it lacked both substantive legislative history and
any jurisdictional element. 146 Despite the statute's failure to pro-
vide these two elements, the Moghadam court still found that boot-
leg compact discs substantially impact interstate commerce. 147 The
court relied upon Congress' underlying motive in enacting the anti-
bootlegging statute. 148 Specifically, the statute was enacted to com-
ply with an international treaty designed to secure uniform global
protection of intellectual property rights. 149 Given that context, the
court concluded that protection of interstate and international
trade was the impetus behind the anti-bootlegging statute and
therefore within the Commerce Clause scope.150 Having resolved
that issue, the Moghadam court examined a more troublesome legal
question.151
The court inquired whether Congress could enact a statute
under one clause in order to avoid problems that arise under an-
other clause. 152 Assuming a statute falls under the auspices of con-
stitutional clause A, but not B, the court must resolve whether
Congress may pass a statute under B, avoiding clause A's con-
straints. 153 The Eleventh Circuit examined cases where a statute
was found constitutional under one clause despite another clause's
146. For further discussion of the federal anti-bootlegging statute's legislative
history, see infra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
147. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 ("The link between bootleg compact
discs and interstate commerce and commerce with foreign nations is self-
evident.").
148. See id. (concluding, "the very reason Congress prohibited [bootlegging]
is because of the deleterious economic effect on the recording industry"). For a
discussion of bootlegging's economic impact, see supra notes 143-45 and accompa-
nying text.
149. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 (noting statute was passed to comply with
World Trade Organization obligations (in form of GATT legislation known as
TRIPs)). For further examination of the legislative impetus for passage of the anti-
bootlegging statute, see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
150. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 (finding that, despite lack of specific
findings, Congressional intent was to regulate interstate commerce).
151. See id. at 1277 (beginning analysis of whether statute that violates one
constitutional clause, may pass scrutiny under another clause).
152. See id. ("The more difficult question in this case is whether Congress can
use its Commerce Clause power to avoid the limitation that might prevent it from
passing the same legislation under the Copyright Clause.").
153. See id. at 1277 (examining whether Congress can pass legislation under
one constitutional clause to avoid limitations of another clause). The Moghadam
court, in resolving this issue, assumes arguendo that the federal anti-bootlegging
statute, lacking the "fixation" requirement inherent in traditional copyright pro-
tection laws, could not derive its constitutional authority from the Copyright
Clause. See id.
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conflicts. 15 4 The court responded by examining the Heart of Atlanta
Motel holding as the leading case on the issue of alternative consti-
tutional construction. 1
5 5
A similar analysis was applied in the Trade-Mark Cases, concern-
ing a trademark protection statute's constitutionality. 156 The Trade-
Mark Cases Court declined to sustain the disputed statute under ei-
ther clause, but the Moghadam court distinguished this case by not-
ing it demonstrated that legislation could be found constitutional
under one clause and not the other, despite statutory conflicts with
the other clause. 157 Additionally, the statute at issue in the Trade-
Mark Cases failed to meet the requirements of the nineteenth cen-
tury interpretation of the Commerce Clause, whereas the anti-boot-
legging clause met the more recent, twentieth century
interpretation of Commerce Clause requirements under Lopez.158
More recently, the Second Circuit applied the Lopez analysis in
determining the constitutionality of a statute protecting the domes-
tic publishing industry from foreign competition. 159 The Authors
League court resolved this issue, holding that even when the statute
exceeds Congress' power under the Copyright Clause, other
sources of congressional power justify the statute's enactment. 160
In other words, the Second Circuit's analysis confirmed the pro-
154. See id. at 1277-79 (noting cases, including Heart of Atlanta Motel and Au-
thors League, exemplifying principle that constitutional clauses must be analyzed
independently of each other, thus granting legitimacy under one clause to statute
barred under another).
155. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1277-79 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel as clear
demonstration of issue). The Supreme Court, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, sustained
the constitutionality of the provisions at issue via the Commerce Clause, noting
that unlike the earlier case, the Civil Rights Act was clearly based on the Com-
merce Clause. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250-
52 (sustaining provision under Commerce Clause, despite similar provision being
overturned on Fourteenth Amendment grounds in nineteenth century). For fur-
ther discussion of the Heart of Atlanta Motel decision, see supra notes 94-96 and
accompanying text.
156. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1277 (citing Trade-Mark Cases as-case relevant
to instant facts). For discussion of the Trade-Mark Cases decision, see supra notes
98-102 and accompanying text.
157. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1278 (reasoning haL t .. ade-AM Cwun
stand for proposition that, even given conflicting constitutional clauses, legislation
may still be sustained).
158. See id. at 1278 (noting that Commerce Clause interpretation has changed
since Trade-Mark Cases decision).
159. See Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding statute constitutional under Commerce Clause, despite statute's nature).
For a discussion of the Authors League decision, see supra notes 103-05 and accom-
panying text.
160. See Authors League, 790 F.2d at 224 (noting that plaintiff failed to realize
Copyright Clause was not only constitutional source).
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position that the Commerce Clause may be used to sustain a stat-
ute's constitutionality despite other clauses' conflicts.' 6'
The Moghadam court also pointed to Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n where the court declined to follow this line of reasoning.162
Railway refused to sustain a statute conflicting with the Bankruptcy
Clause under a clause that did not conflict.' 63 In resolving the con-
flict between the two lines of cases, the Moghadam court took great
pains in narrowing its holding to the particular facts of the case. 164
The court found that the anti-bootlegging statute met the Lopez
Commerce Clause requirements.' 65 Additionally, the court also
found circumstances where, as noted in Railway, the Commerce
Clause cannot be used to support a statute that would fail constitu-
tional muster under a different clause. 166 Given such findings, the
Moghadam court warned it would not sustain a statute under the
Commerce Clause if there were "fundamental inconsistencies" be-
tween the Commerce Clause use and the Copyright Clause
limitation. 167
The Moghadam court held that the Copyright Clause does not
forbid Congress from granting "copyright-like" protection under
other clauses, such as the Commerce Clause. 168 Unlike the Railway
case, the court concluded that imposing such protections raises no
conflicts between the two clauses. 169 Moreover, granting quasi-cop-
161. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279 ("The Authors League analysis suggests
that the Commerce Clause may be used to accomplish that which the Copyright
Clause may not allow.").
162. See id. (noting "tension" between analysis of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Trade-
Mark Cases and Authors League and the analysis of Railway Labor Executives).
163. For further discussion of Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, see supra notes
107-11 and accompanying text.
164. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280 (declaring that "in resolving this ten-
sion.., we undertake a circumscribed analysis, deciding only what is necessary to
decide this case .... ").
165. See id. (noting that holding relied upon conclusion that anti-bootlegging
statute could be constitutionally justified by Commerce Clause). For a discussion
of the Lopez analysis of the Commerce Clause, see supra notes 141-50 and accompa-
nying text.
166. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280 (asserting that underlying holding is no-
tion that Commerce Clause may be used to support statute otherwise forbidden
under Copyright Clause).
167. See id. at 1280 n.12 (assuming that if statute's use of Commerce Clause
fundamentally conflicted with Copyright Clause restriction, Commerce Clause
could not be used to bypass that restriction).
168. See id. at 1280 (noting that while live performances lack fixation, they
certainly are entitled to some quasi-copyright protection).
169. See id. at 1281 ("Common sense does not indicate that extending copy-
right-like protection to a live performance [under the Commerce Clause] is funda-
mentally inconsistent with the Copyright Clause.").
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yright protection for "unfixed" live musical performances was in the
spirit of the Copyright Clause, even though it lacked the "fixation"
requirement. 170 The court noted that under the Sound Recording
Act of 1971 and its immediate progeny, musical artists could impose
copyright protection simply by simultaneously recording any live
performances. 17' Given that, the court concluded that the statute
did not violate copyright precepts but merely extended protection,
albeit via another clause. 172
V. CRiTICAL ANALYSIS
The Moghadam court, faced with an issue of first impression,
orchestrated a sound analysis in determining the anti-bootlegging
statute's constitutionality. The court sustained the statute under
the Commerce Clause, declining to consider whether the constitu-
tionality of the statute under the Copyright Clause also rang true.173
Additionally, with a close eye on the nation's commerce pulse, the
court avoided any sour notes by reconciling two conflicting lines of
Supreme Court cases.' 74 In some respects, the court was almost
forced to conduct itself the way it did. 175
The court avoided any conclusive Copyright Clause interpreta-
tion of the anti-bootlegging statute in its first prong of analysis. 176
Despite citing a plethora of authority questioning the statute's con-
170. See id. at 1280 ("[E]xtending such protection actually complements and
is in harmony with the existing scheme that Congress has set up under the Copy-
right Clause.").
171. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1281 (1999) (noting that
performer under prior law could protect live musical performances, bypassing
Copyright Clause's fixation requirement by simultaneously recording
performance).
172. See id. at 1282 (stating that anti-bootlegging statute satisfies Commerce
Clause requirements, avoiding affirmative ruling that statute lacked fundamental
Copyright Clause requirements).
173. See id. at 1272 (noting "what little legislative history exists tends to sug-
gest that Congress viewed the [statute] as enacted pursuant to its Copyright Clause
authority") (citing 140 CONG. REc. H11441, H11457 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Hughes)). For a discussion of the court's Commerce Clause
analysis, see supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
174. For further discussion of the court's recognition of bootlegging's eco-
nomic impact and distinguishing of cases discussing use of one constitutional
clause over another to sustain a statute, see supra notes 152-72 and accompanying
text.
175. For a discussion of alternative holdings from the Moghadam decision, see
infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
176. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 (assuming, without affirmatively ruling,
that Copyright Clause's fixation requirement precluded constitutional support of
federal anti-bootlegging statute). For a discussion of the reasons behind the
court's assumption, see supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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stitutional support, the court declined to rule that the Copyright
Clause's fixation requirement precluded support. 177 If the court
upheld the statute under the Copyright Clause, two centuries ofju-
dicial and legislative history maintaining fixation as an inherent
copyright element would be questioned. 178
The Moghadam court's second prong of analysis, holding the
statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause, also withstands
scrutiny, though not without criticism. 179 This court was the first to
sustain, under the Commerce Clause, copyright legislation exceed-
ing the Copyright Clause's authority.180 The court had difficulty,
however, locating rational basis elements that would assist in deter-
mining substantial economic impact upon commerce. 81
The court asserted that no legislative findings discussing the
impact of live performance bootlegs upon interstate commerce ex-
ist.182 Such findings, however, do exist with respect to statutory
drafts of the anti-bootlegging statute. 183 During a debate on the
177. See id. at 1274 (citing scholarly comments discounting notion that Copy-
right Clause could grant constitutional support for federal anti-bootlegging stat-
ute); cf id. at 1281 (suggesting "fixation, as a constitutional concept, is something
less than a rigid, inflexible barrier to Congressional power").
178. For an historical overview of the fixation requirement, see supra notes
64-69 and accompanying text. But see CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967)
(holding that "in view of the federal policy of encouraging intellectual creation by
granting a limited monopoly at best, we think it sensible to say that the constitu-
tional clause extends to any concrete, describable manifestation of intellectual cre-
ation [thereby excluding a tangible form requirement]").
179. For a discussion of the Moghadam court's second prong of analysis, see
supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
180. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 1.09, at 1-66.39 (asserting
that while several cases have mentioned possibility in dicta, no firm authority has
emerged); see also Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1410 (commenting "notwithstanding
that the anti-bootlegging provision unquestionably violates Copyright Clause au-
thority, let us assume . .. it falls within Commerce Clause authority.").
181. For a discussion of the apparent lack of substantive rational basis ele-
ments, see supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. Rational basis elements
would support a finding of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. See id.
182. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 ("[T]here are no legislative findings in
the record regarding the effect of bootlegging of live musical performances on
interstate or foreign commerce.").
183. See Brown, supra note 4, at 47-55 (discussing proposed legislation that
paralleled language of finalized anti-bootlegging statute).
In early August, Congress introduced House Bill 4894 and Senate Bill 2368.
See id. at 47 (citing H.R. 4894, 103d Cong. § 102 (1994); S. 2368, 103d Cong. §§ 8-
10 (1994)). The title of House Bill 4894 was the "Federal Anti-Bootleg Act of
1994" and contained language imposing civil liability upon those who trafficked in
bootleg sound recordings. See id. at 48 (citing H.R. 4894, 103d Cong. § 102(1994)). The bill imposed liability upon those who copied, transmitted or distrib-
uted an unauthorized fixation of a live performance. See id. Interestingly, the bill
imposed liability upon unauthorized copying of music videos of live performances.
See id. Unlike the House Bill, the Senate Bill excluded liability from music videos
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bills held before a joint session of Congress, the RIAA asserted that
the proposed legislation, imposing criminal penalties for bootleg-
ging, would help "curtail[ ] an illicit trade currently generating
about one billion dollars annually."' 8 4
Before Congress voted upon the statutory drafts, White House-
approved legislation, similar in language to the proposed drafts,
was introduced in Congress on September 27, 1994.185 The House
Ways and Means Committee approved the White House version on
September 28, 1994, and the Senate Finance Committee approved
the same on September 29, 1994.186 Congress considered the legis-
lation on November 29, 1994 after adjourning on October 7,
1994.187 The House passed the legislation that same day and the
Senate followed in early December, leaving scant room for any de-
bate or legislative findings.18 8 While the enacted statute contained
of live performances but added criminal penalties. See id. at 49 (citing S. 2368,
103d Cong. § 3(a) (1994) (formulating draft version of criminal penalties eventu-
ally codified with similar language as 18 U.S.C. § 2319A)). The remaining statu-
tory language of the civil portion of the Senate Bill was similar to the House Bill.
See Brown, supra note 4, at 49.
184. GATT and Intellectual Property: Hearings on H.R 4894 and S. 2368 Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the House Subcomm. of
the Judiciary on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, 103d Cong. (1994)
(statement of Jason Berman, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Recording
Industry Ass'n of America).
185. See Brown, supra note 4, at 51-52 (noting introduction of House Bill 5110
and Senate Bill 2467, both bills containing language similar to Senate Bill 2368).
House Bill 5110 included protection of music videos of live performances and kept
relatively the same language as the earlier House draft. See id. (citing H.R. 5110,
103d Cong. § 510 (1994)).
186. See Brown, supra note 4, at 54 (stating dates proposed legislation passed
in their respective committees). Perhaps Congress felt no need to debate given
that ajoint discussion on similar legislation was held a month earlier. For a discus-
sion of this joint session of Congress, see supra note 184 and accompanying text.
187. See Brown, supra note 4, at 54 (commenting that procedural option was
exercised delaying for forty-five days House's vote to consider proposed legislation
which was originally scheduled for October 5, 1994).
188. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 8E.02, at 8E-6 to -7, nn.26 -
30 (noting scant legistlauve support justifying pa sage of statute); Intellectual Prob-
erty: GAT Bill Brings Major Reforms to Domestic Intellectual Property Law, PAT. TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) 7 (Dec. 5, 1994) (stating that House passed House Bill
5110 on November 29, 1994 and Senate passed Senate Bill 2467 on December 1,
1994). "When passed in December by a largely lame duck Congress, not one
comma was altered." Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1408 (commenting on lack of
changes to legislation after committee approval) (footnote omitted). The Senate
Report discusses the copyright provision for two pages while the House Report
does the same but only in a single paragraph. See Sobel, supra note 31, at 10.
When the White House presented its analysis of the proposed legislation, less than
twelve pages discussed copyrights. See id. President Clinton soon thereafter signed
House Bill 5110 into law. See Brown, supra note 4, at 54.
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little legislative history given the time limits, the court declined to
examine prior drafts.18 9
By that same token, no jurisdictional element is evident in the
statutory language. 190 Even lacking those elements, a statute does
not necessarily fail Commerce Clause constitutional scrutiny. 19 1
This finding is not without its critics, as any copyright legislation
could theoretically find Commerce Clause support, eviscerating the
Copyright Clause's intent. 192 Additionally, while the court noted
that Congress enacted this legislation under the Copyright Clause's
189. For further discussion of the statutory draft of the legislation, see supra
notes 183-85 and accompanying text. Moghadam's holding suggests that even in
cases concerning fast-tracked legislation, the court may determine the congres-
sional intent on its own, despite a complete lack of legislative history.
190. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 ("Section 2319A also contains no juris-
dictional element as is commonly found in criminal statutes passed under author-
ity of the Commerce Clause."). For example, a jurisdictional element would be
statutory language requiring that the bootleg copies traveled in interstate com-
merce. See id. (discussing various examples where jurisdictional element sustained
statute's constitutionality). The statutory drafts, discussed supra, also lacked ajuris-
dictional element indicative of Commerce Clause reliance. See Brown, supra note 4
(citing H.R. 4894, 103d Cong. § 102 (1994); S. 2368, 103d Cong. §§ 8-10 (1994)).
This is not surprising given that the final statutory language differs little from the
proposed legislation. See Brown, supra note 4, at 52 (noting similarities between
House Bill 5110 and House Bill 4894).
191. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275-76 (noting that lack of either jurisdic-
tional or legislative factors does not automatically negate statute). For a discussion
of how the Moghadam court examined the federal anti-bootlegging statute without
substantive legislative history or any jurisdictional element, see supra notes 147-50
and accompanying text.
192. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, § 8.01 [C], at 8E-8 (comment-
ing that if Congress may lawfully pass anti-bootlegging statute, "is there any amend-
ment to copyright law it cannot make under the commerce banner?"); TRuIE, supra
note 79, § 5-4 ("The power to regulate 'commerce' necessarily encompasses power,
for whatever purpose it might be exercised, over all activities that are themselves
part of the production or distribution of wealth in the broadest economic sense of
that term, but not power over all activities, period.") (emphasis in original); Nim-
mer, supra note 35, at 1409, 1411 (questioning use of Commerce Clause to sustain
copyright legislation, commenting that "one seeks in vain for evidence that anyone
in Washington even considered the constitutional basis for [this statute]").
"[C]opyright has been transformed into an instrumentality towards [the world of
trade] .... The orchestrator of that instrumentality... is the law of trade ....
[Clopyright now serves as an adjunct of trade . . . ." Nimmer, supra note 35, at
1412 (footnotes omitted); cf Goodwin, supra note 4, at 386 (noting need for new
standard for contributory copyright infringement actions if anti-bootlegging stat-
ute was not passed under Copyright Clause). But see Sobel, supra note 31, at 11-12
(praising Congress' willingness to implement copyright protection for all sorts of
unfixed works using the Commerce Clause). "[R]eliance on the Commerce
Clause to amend the Copyright Act opens the door to all types of additional
amendments.. . thought to be beyond the reach of copyright law." Id. at 12 (not-
ing that lectures, dramatic performances, improvisational comedy and works in-
volving effort but not traditional requirements of "creativity" such as databases and
alphabetized telephone directories may be granted copyright protection under
Commerce Clause).
[Vol. 7: p. 327
32
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol7/iss2/6
2000] RESOLVING THE DISSONANT CONSTITUTIONAL CHORDS 359
purview, the court found another constitutional basis supporting
the statute. 193 While this finding is not without precedent, it raises
the specter that any copyright legislation lacking similar elements
could find Commerce Clause redemption. 194
A similar apparition haunts the court's conclusion that Con-
gress could pass a statute using one constitutional clause to avoid
another clause's limitations.195 The court was wary that unfettered
approval of the statute would allow Congress to pass a statute, fall-
ing within the scope of one clause, under another, avoiding any
potential constitutional limitations of the first clause. 196 Given that
fear, however, the court adroitly avoided any pitfalls in determining
if and when Congress may pass a statute conflicting with one consti-
tutional clause under another. 197 In holding that the Commerce
Clause may be used in limited circumstances to pass a statute violat-
ing the Copyright Clause precepts, the court distinguished a case
suggesting the opposite. 198
The court distinguished the holding from Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Ass'n that the Commerce Clause could not sustain a statute
undermining the Bankruptcy Clause's authority. 199 Unlike the
Bankruptcy Clause barring non-uniform laws, the Moghadam court
193. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 (asserting that Congress thought it was
acting under Copyright Clause); Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1409 (observing that all
prior enactments under Tide 17 derive constitutional authority from Copyright
Clause); cf. Deas, supra note 3, at 570 (noting questionable reliance by Congress on
Copyright Clause power).
194. See Appeals Court Backs Anti-Bootlegging Statute, supra note 139, at 3 (quot-
ing David A. Nickerson, Moghadam's counsel, "[T] he appeals court ducked what
we clearly raised [in court]: If it's okay to assume that you can make copyright kind
of fights under the commerce clause, why do you need the copyright clause at
all?"). For further discussion of the effect of the Moghadam holding, see infra notes
215-17 and accompanying text. The Moghadam court noted in passing this possibil-
ity, commenting that "Congress would not be able to circumvent the originality
requirement inherent in the term "Writings" in the Copyright Clause by passing a
statute under the Commerce Clause which extended copyright-like protection to
unoriginal works." Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279 (citing Paul J. Heald, The Vices of
Originality, 1991 Sup. CT. REv. 143, 168-75 (1992)); see also 1 NIMMER ON COPY-
IGHT, supra note 31, § 1.09, at 1-66.41 (noting protection of unpublished works
would probably be unavailable under Commerce Clause "copyright" statute).
195. For an examination of the court's choice of the Commerce Clause over
the Copyright Clause, see infra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
196. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281 n.14, 1282 (taking great care in limiting
its holding to facts and reiterating its decision to not constitutionally invalidate
anti-bootlegging statute under Copyright Clause).
197. For an examination of Railway Labor Executives'Ass'n, see supra notes 162-
67 and accompanying text.
198. For discussion of the court's distinguishing of the Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Ass'n decision, see supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
199. For discussion of Railroad Labor Executives' Ass'n, see supra notes 162-67
and accompanying text.
33
Lee: Resolving the Dissonant Constitutional Chords Inherent in the Fed
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
360 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
noted that the Copyright Clause does not restrict copyright legisla-
tion from passage under the Commerce Clause. 200 The court's
valid recognition of this both avoided constitutional conflict with
the Copyright Clause and protected the music industry from
theft. 20'
The court's analysis, however, relied on an assumption, not a
firm ruling, that the anti-bootlegging statute violates the Copyright
Clause. 202 In Authors League, the court failed to apply any Copyright
Clause analysis, sustaining the statute under the Commerce
Clause.203 The Moghadam court applied both a Copyright and
Commerce Clause analysis in finding Commerce Clause support. 20 4
Both the Authors League and Moghadam courts heard the argument
that the statute lacked Copyright Clause constitutional support.205
It is unclear why the Moghadam court did not solely apply a Com-
merce Clause analysis similar to Authors League.206 Given the liberal
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, it appears that copyright
legislation would almost always find constitutional support.20 7
200. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280 (holding that Copyright Clause does not
preclude Congress from granting quasi-copyright protection via other constitu-
tional clauses to "Writing[s]" lacking fixation element). For a general discussion
of the requirements of the Copyright Clause, see supra notes 59-73. The court in
Moghadam asserted that "Writing" is not a limiting term, and it in no way limits
copyright legislation solely to the Copyright Clause. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at
1280. Injust two sentences, the court allowed other clauses to sustain constitution-
ally copyright legislation. For a discussion of the dangers of substituting the Com-
merce Clause in place of the Copyright Clause for copyright legislation, see supra
notes 191-94 and accompanying text. The court rationalized this assertion, noting
that copyright legislation passed under other clauses furthers the core purpose of
the Copyright Clause. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280.
201. For a discussion questioning the need to apply the Copyright Clause
analysis when the Commerce Clause can be used, see infra notes 204-07 and ac-
companying text.
202. For a discussion of cases that balanced the commerce power against cop-
yright protection, see supra notes 129-72 and accompanying text.
203. For a discussion of the Authors League holding, see supra notes 103-05 and
accompanying text.
204. For a further explanation of the cases applied in Moghadam, see supra
notes 129-67 and accompanying text.
205. See Authors League, 790 F.2d at 224. Plaintiffs argued that the statute was
constitutionally invalid as it was "tenuously related to the goal [s]" of the Copyright
Clause. See id. The court declined to respond directly to this argument, instead
noting that the Commerce Clause justified this statute, regardless of the statute's
placement in the copyrights section of the United States Code. See id. For a discus-
sion of the Moghadam statute's lack of a fundamental copyright element, see supra
notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of the Authors League holding, see supra notes 103-05 and
accompanying text.
207. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 n.12 (noting that "the Commerce
Clause could not be used to avoid a limitation in the Copyright Clause if the partic-
ular use of the Commerce Clause (e.g., the anti-bootlegging statute) were funda-
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VI. IMPACT
Despite the noted constitutional flaws of the anti-bootlegging
statute and the problems inherent with passing copyright statutes
under the Commerce Clause, the court ruled properly.20 8 Perhaps
the court was aware of the negative economic impact that bootleg
recordings have on the music industry.20 9 There were several possi-
ble outcomes of this case. 210 If the court had affirmatively ruled the
anti-bootlegging statute constitutional under the Copyright Clause,
that would have violated two hundred years of legal tradition re-
quiring fixation. 21 1 The music industry would be left to rely on
state statutory protection against bootlegs if the court ruled the stat-
ute unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause.212 If the court
applied only the Commerce Clause analysis, but found lacking a
substantial effect upon commerce, the music industry would re-
main without federal protection.21 3 The court essentially was al-
most waylaid into following this path, balancing public policy
against the requirements of law. The Moghadam court, neverthe-
less, did not affirmatively settle the issue raised by both parties and
scholarly commentators alike, namely the anti-bootlegging statute's
constitutionality under the Copyright Clause.214
The Moghadam court's decision, despite those issues, is sound,
lightly stepping through a constitutional minefield in choosing to
grant live musical performances quasi-copyright protection.21 5 The
court, caught between maintaining the public policy need of
mentally inconsistent with the particular limitation in the Copyright Clause (e.g.,
the fixation requirement)"). If the court found the anti-bootlegging statute lacked
the limited time requirement of the Copyright Clause, the Commerce Clause
could not pass the statute. See id. at 1281 n.14. For a discussion of the court's
handling of the Commerce Clause, see supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
208. For a discussion of the difficult choice the Moghadam court faced, see
supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
209. For a discussion of bootlegs' detrimental impact upon the music indus-
try, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
210. For a discussion of the impact of alternative holdings such as upholding
the statute under the Copyright Clause, see infra notes 211-13 and accompanying
text.
211. For a discussion of the inherent requirement of fixation in copyright
laws, see supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
212. For a list of states that classify bootlegging as a felony, see supra note 29.
213. For a discussion of the negative economic impact of bootlegged record-
ings upon music industry, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
214. For a discussion of the failure by the court to settle the statute's constitu-
tionality under the Copyright Clause, see supra notes 129-39 and accompanying
text.
215. For an examination of the protection granted under the Commerce
Clause, see supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
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criminalizing bootlegging and judicial case law holding fixation a
copyright clause elemental requirement, composed a decision that
fulfilled public need without directly conflicting with two centuries
of constitutional law.216 The music industry received what it re-
quested: copyright protection for live musical performances. The
judicial system also received what it wanted: a decision not conflict-
ing with two centuries of case law. The court placed an analytical
facade over the anti-bootlegging statute's constitutionality under
the Copyright Clause, not affirmatively resolving all the raised con-
stitutional issues.217 Instead, the Moghadam court declined to rule
directly via a Copyright Clause analysis upon the anti-bootlegging
statute's constitutionality.2 18 As the curtain rises on the twenty-first
century and original works of intellectual labor are composed in
non-tangible media, fundamental alterations must be orchestrated
for continued Copyright Clause effectiveness. The Eleventh Circuit
cleverly composed a decision that avoided tortuous legal brambles
to a finale amenable to both sides. The next court to decide a simi-
lar issue may be unable to, and given the appropriate facts, may be
forced to re-interpret the Copyright Clause for the twenty-first cen-
tury.
Keith V Lee
216. For further discussion of the impact of an unconstitutional ruling, see
supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
217. For further discussion of the analytical facade by the Moghadam court,
see supra notes 182-94 and accompanying text.
218. For a discussion of the Moghadam court's analysis, see supra notes 126-39
and accompanying text.
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